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The most salient set of recent criticisms of biofuels relate to their impact on food prices and 
the environment. rapidly escalating food prices have stressed many developing countries 
and poor households while recent studies argue that indirect land-use changes due to 
biofuels may enhance greenhouse-gas emissions (runge and Senauer, 007; Searchinger 
et al., 008). The potential misalignment of policy effects and stated objectives means it 
is important to understand the economic-efficiency and income-distribution effects of 
government biofuel policies on agricultural, biofuel and gasoline markets. 
This paper summarizes the key aspects affecting the social costs and benefits of US 
biofuel policies. we first outline the various public-policy goals and categorize the con-
comitant policies adopted. we then analyze the social costs/benefits of alternative biofuel 
policies, determine who benefits and who loses and by how much, and how policy reforms 
can better achieve policy goals. we show that policies have been counterproductive in 
several instances and so can be much improved. we highlight the interaction effects 
between policies. for example, the sole cause of biofuel production in the United States 
historically, for the most part, was biofuel- and feedstock-production subsidies. tax credits 
and mandates by themselves would have generated little if no ethanol production. oil 
prices were so low that the intercept of the ethanol supply curve has been well above oil 
prices historically. This means tax costs were wasted and benefited no group. tax credits, 
therefore, had minimal impacts on corn prices at low levels of oil prices. But at higher oil 
prices, tax credits then can potentially have a larger impact on corn prices. 
we also determine that mandates are more efficient than tax credits for the same level 
of ethanol production because mandates result in higher gasoline prices and lower Co 
emissions and miles traveled. when tax credits are used in conjunction with mandates, 
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the effects of biofuel tax credits are reversed. By themselves, tax credits subsidize biofuel 
consumption, but with mandates the same tax credit subsidizes gasoline consumption. 
This has major implications for countries worldwide that also use both tax credits and 
mandates.
This paper is outlined as follows. after defining policy categories and objectives, we 
show how a tax credit affects the market. we assess historical data and determine that 
the United States ethanol policy was very uncompetitive unless substantial subsidies were 
forthcoming. we then explain how mandates work and compare their effects to tax credits. 
The key result that the effects of a tax credit are reversed when used in conjunction with 
mandates is then explained. after explaining how ethanol-import tariffs affect the market, 
we conclude with the lessons learned for future policy adjustments.
Policy objectives and Instruments
The policy objectives are threefold:
• to reduce dependence on oil, 
• to improve the environment (reduce local air pollution and mitigate global 
 climate change), and
• to improve farm incomes, reduce tax costs of farm-subsidy programs and stimulate 
rural development (rajagopal and Zilberman 007).
Given the plethora of policy objectives, governments have implemented myriad policies. 
Biofuel policies generally promote biofuel production and substitution for petroleum fuels 
in consumption. The most important of these policies are fourfold: 
• tax credits,
• mandates,
• import tariffs, and
• production subsidies for ethanol and corn.
It is difficult to determine a priori which of the tax credits (totaling $0.57 per gallon 
if we include both state and federal credits) or the mandates (several state and federal 
mandates exist, either explicit or de facto via environmental regulations) are more im-
portant. according to de Gorter and Just (008b), over 5% of total fuel consumption 
is affected by tax exemptions for biofuels. Meanwhile, a recent fao bulletin concluded 
that “virtually all existing laws to promote…biofuels set blending requirements, mean-
ing the percentages of biofuels that should be mixed with conventional fuels” (Jull et al., 
007). Most countries have huge import tariffs on biofuels while production subsidies for 
biofuels and biofuel feedstocks are very significant (Steenblik, 007). we will, therefore, 
also touch upon the effects of production subsidies for biofuels and biofuel feedstocks 
and of biofuel import tariffs.1
1for a comprehensive documentation of all types of US ethanol policies including import tariffs and ethanol 
production subsidies, see Koplow (007). a complete exposition of the welfare effects of US biofuel policy 
discussed in this paper is given in de Gorter and Just (007a,b; 008a,b,c).
59
How tax Credits affect the Corn, ethanol and  
Gasoline Markets
The federal government offers a $0.5 per gallon tax credit for the use of ethanol. State 
tax credits of about $0.0 per gallon need to be added. The economic incentive of a tax 
credit is to have the ethanol price bid up above the gasoline price by the amount of the tax 
credit. otherwise, blenders would be foregoing money represented in the tax credit. The 
tax credit is an ethanol-consumption subsidy, but because ethanol is a perfect substitute 
for gasoline and gasoline prices are assumed to be invariant to ethanol production, the 
incidence of the subsidy is such that ethanol producers get the full benefit. The market 
price of ethanol is, therefore, determined by the following equation (see de Gorter and 
Just 008a for details):
 PE = lPG – (1– l)t + tc ()
where PE is the market price of ethanol, PG is the price of gasoline, l is the ratio of miles 
per gallon of ethanol relative to gasoline and equals 0.70 when adjusted to an e00 basis, 
and tc is the tax credit (higher than the fuel tax t in the United States). If the tax credit 
is eliminated, then the market price is equal to lPG – (1 – l)t. It is interesting to note in 
this situation that t is a disproportionate tax on ethanol because it is levied on a volume 
basis. Increasing the fuel tax reduces the market price for ethanol. note that domestic 
and foreign producers of ethanol benefit alike from this tax credit.
The Link Between the Corn and Ethanol Markets
The corn price is directly linked to the ethanol price. Denote b as the gallons of ethanol 
produced from one bushel of corn and denote d as the proportion of the value of corn 
returned to the market in the form of byproducts, then the price of corn (equal to PEb, 
the price of ethanol in $/bu) is given by:
 PEb =(  ) (lPG – (– l)t + tc  )–co ()
where co is the processing cost. estimates from eidman (007) indicate that b equals .8 
and d equals 0.3. The resulting value of b/(-d) is 4. a tax credit of $0.5 per gallon 
translates into approximately a $.04 per bushel subsidy to corn farmers. This means that 
the corn price is very sensitive to a change in the price of ethanol (induced by either a 
change in the tax credit or world oil price). However, farmers historically have not been 
able to take advantage of such a large subsidy, because the intercept of the ethanol-sup-
ply curve is above the oil price. This means a significant part of the tax credit has been 
redundant. we call this “water” in the tax credit.
Because the intercept of the ethanol supply curve in the United States has been far above 
the price of oil, the resulting “water” in the tax credit generates “rectangular” deadweight 
costs. rectangular deadweight costs are defined as that part of the tax cost of the tax credit 
that is not a transfer to domestic producers or any other domestic or foreign interest group. 
This exacerbates the social costs of ethanol policies compared to standard analysis. 
b
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Historical Price 
relationships for 
ethanol in the  
United States
There are several impor-
tant conclusions when 
analyzing the historical 
experience of biofuel poli-
cies in the United States. 
first, the price premium 
for ethanol over gasoline 
has exceeded the tax credit 
for the past 5 years. This 
is shown in fig.  where 
the actual ethanol price 
is higher than the price 
that otherwise would be if 
only a tax credit affected 
ethanol prices and con-
sumers purchased ethanol 
only for its contribution 
to mileage. this means 
that because the “actual 
ethanol price” line in fig.  
is above the “ethanol price 
if tax credit only” line, the 
tax credit was dormant.2 
How can one explain the 
fact that the ethanol price 
premium was above the 
tax credit in these years? 
Mandates at local, state 
and federal levels always 
2not exactly “dormant” because 
as we show below, when the 
ethanol premium exceeds the 
tax credit, a de facto mandate or 
ethanol purchased on the basis 
of its additive value necessarily 
implies that the effects of the tax 
credit are reversed: it subsidizes 
oil consumption! 
figure . ethanol prices: actual; with tax credit only;
if no policy.

existed, but were never 
binding. two explana-
tions are plausible (tyner 
007). one is that there 
were de facto mandates 
due to environmental 
regulations (the Clean air 
act in the 990s and the 
implicit ban on MtBe 
in this decade). another 
explanation is that blend-
ers purchased ethanol for 
its additive value as an oc-
tane enhancer/oxygenate. 
This means ethanol was 
purchased in fixed propor-
tions to gasoline, implying 
a blend-consumption-
mandate model. 
another important 
finding is that the actual 
observed corn price was 
always below the etha-
nol price premium until 
007/08 (fig. ). In fact, 
the corn price is observed 
to be lower than the tax 
credit itself in 9 of the 
5 years! This is, at first 
glance, puzzling—how 
can the implied subsidy 
of the tax credit be greater 
than the corn price itself? 
we explained earlier that 
the corn price is to in-
crease by the amount of 
the tax credit or ethanol 
price premium due to its 
additive value or de facto 
mandates.
The key to understand-
ing this is twofold (see de 
figure . ethanol price premium, corn price and tax credit 
in dollars per bushel.
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Gorter and Just 008b for complete details). first, one has to recognize that the intercept 
of the ethanol-supply curve was above the gasoline price. In other words, if there were no 
ethanol price premium due to either its additive value or tax credits, there would be no 
ethanol production. Costs of production would exceed the price of gasoline. This means 
that part of the tax costs are what we call rectangular deadweight costs: it costs taxpayers, 
but nobody benefits as the gap between the gasoline price and intercept of the ethanol 
supply curve has to be closed first.
Second, not only was the intercept of ethanol supply below the price of gasoline, but 
it also was above the price of corn. The only way this can happen is with production 
subsidies for corn and/or ethanol. These subsidies are the only reason for ethanol produc-
tion in these cases. In other words, even with the tax credit and premiums due to additive 
value, there would be no ethanol production unless there were production subsidies for 
corn and/or ethanol as well.
How the Tax Credit Affects the Taxpayer Costs of Farm Subsidies
Proponents of US ethanol policy argue that the tax credit reduces the tax costs of farm 
subsidy programs. There are two particularly important issues to analyze: the tax credit 
increases both the tax costs and economic inefficiencies of farm-subsidy programs like 
the loan rate program, and, vice versa, farm subsidies increase the tax costs of the tax 
credit and increase economic inefficiencies due to the tax credit. There are also increased 
environmental costs of increased agricultural production and adverse effects on consum-
ers (livestock and poor developing-country consumers). Hence, one does not want to 
introduce biofuel policy to mitigate the effects of farm subsidy programs.
Effect of Tax Credits on Gasoline Consumption, CO2 Emissions and  
Miles Traveled 
So far, we have determined the effect of the tax credit on ethanol prices and production. 
If oil prices are assumed not to change with increased ethanol production, the ethanol 
production displaces gasoline consumption gallon for gallon. But if the supply curve for 
oil is upward sloping and so oil prices are affected by ethanol production, then the effects 
of the tax credit will be to increase fuel supply such that the price of gasoline falls. This 
means less ethanol production and more fuel consumption. Hence, the reduction in 
gasoline consumption is less than before with a fixed oil price. But the tax credit always 
increases fuel consumption (while lowering gasoline consumption). This means that the 
effect of the tax credit on miles traveled is always positive because consumers buy ethanol 
on the basis of its contribution to mileage. The impact of the tax credit on Co emissions, 
however, is ambiguous. 
the economics of Biofuel Mandates
Understanding the effects of mandates is very important. first, many countries have man-
dates. Second, historical price premiums for ethanol above the tax credit in the United 
States, as shown in fig. , suggest that a mandate existed (de facto due to environmental 
regulations or due to ethanol purchased for its additive value). Third, the new renewable 
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fuel standard (rfS) in the recently passed energy Independence and Security act (eISa) 
mandates the use of 3 billion gallons of renewable fuel by 0 in the United States.
Consider a biofuel-consumption mandate of the level QE. Because no tax costs are 
 involved with a mandate, the consumer has to pay the weighted average price of the biofuel 
and gasoline where the weights are formed by the required consumption of biofuels:
 PF = PEQE + PG(CF – QE) (3)
where PF is the weighted average fuel price for consumers, CF is the consumption of fuel, 
PE is the market price of ethanol and QE is the mandated level of ethanol consumption. 
If we assume that oil prices do not vary with ethanol production, the transfer to ethanol 
producers is completely financed by an implicit consumer tax on gasoline. for the same 
level of ethanol production, this necessarily implies that gasoline consumption is lower with 
a mandate compared to tax credit. recall in the analysis of a tax credit there is no effect 
on total fuel consumption with a tax credit and fixed oil price. total fuel consumption 
remains the same, but gasoline consumption declines by the level of ethanol production 
QE. But with a mandate, total fuel consumption declines, necessarily resulting in a lower 
level of gasoline consumption compared to a tax credit.
now consider the case where the supply curve for gasoline is upward sloping. with a 
tax credit, total fuel consumption increases and world oil price declines. But in the case 
of a mandate, an upward-sloping supply curve for oil will now result in the mandate 
 acting as a tax on oil producers but not always a tax on consumers, depending on market 
parameters. Sometimes a mandate will be a tax on consumers, but in other cases it will 
subsidize fuel consumers even though there are no taxpayer costs. In this case, oil producers 
are transferring income to both ethanol producers and fuel consumers.
nevertheless, regardless of market conditions, compared to tax credits that achieve the 
same level of ethanol consumption, a mandate results in higher fuel prices and lower fuel 
consumption (even though a mandate can generate an increase in fuel consumption). 
This means a mandate is preferred to a tax credit when there is a sub-optimal gasoline 
tax like in the United States. a mandate also saves taxpayer costs and does not incur the 
inefficiency costs of taxation.
the economics of a Biofuel Mandate and tax Credit Combined
So far, we have determined the equilibrium with a blend mandate and compared the 
efficiency of a mandate to that of taxes and subsidies under different policy goals. But 
policymakers seem intent on using mandates and tax credits in concert. 
President Bush signed into law the eISa on 9 December 007, which established 
the largest increase in a biofuels mandate in history. The new mandate, known as the 
rfS, requires the use of at least 3 billion gallons of biofuels in 0, a fivefold increase 
over current rfS levels. By 0, biofuels could represent over 0% of US automobile 
fuel consumption. 
Meanwhile, the new legislation calls for the continuation of the federal biofuel tax 
credit of $0.5 per gallon which, when combined with state tax credits, will potentially 
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cost taxpayers over $ billion by 0.3 tax credits by themselves encourage ethanol 
production as a replacement for oil-based gasoline consumption. But with mandates in 
place, the tax credits will unintentionally subsidize gasoline consumption instead. This 
contradicts the new energy bill’s stated objectives of reducing dependency on oil, improving 
the environment and enhancing rural prosperity. This result is independent of the issues 
related to indirect land use and Co life-cycle analysis that is currently in the forefront 
of the public debate over biofuels.
The effects of current policies are mind-boggling. The billions of tax dollars to be 
spent will be a pure waste and will have profound consequences beyond that. transfers 
of wealth to the Middle east will increase, leading to even more dependence on oil and 
energy insecurity. air quality will decline while Co emissions will increase. Meanwhile, 
the resulting rise in oil prices hurts farmers through higher input costs, while ethanol 
prices are unchanged as ethanol consumption remains at mandated levels. 
The unintended result of a tax credit switching to a gasoline subsidy in the presence of 
a government mandate is easily explained. Consider first how the tax credit would work 
by itself. to take advantage of the government subsidy offered them, blenders of ethanol 
and gasoline will bid up the price of ethanol until it is above the market price of gasoline 
by the amount of the tax credit. If the price premium over gasoline is less than the tax 
credit, then blenders will be making windfall profits from the government subsidy by 
pocketing the difference. But competition among blenders will ensure that there will be 
no “free money left on the table,” and the price of ethanol will, therefore, exceed that of 
gasoline by the full $0.57 per gallon tax credit. 
now consider the case where the ethanol price is determined by the binding man-
date—3 billion gallons by 0—and there is no tax credit. The consumer “fuel” price 
is a weighted average of the ethanol and gasoline prices. Implicitly, consumers pay a 
higher price for gasoline to finance the same ethanol production as before, when only the 
tax credit was in place. now introduce a tax credit alongside the mandate. Because the 
ethanol price premium due to the mandate exceeds the tax credit, there is no incentive 
for blenders to bid up the price of ethanol as before. Instead, blenders will offer a lower 
fuel price to consumers to take advantage of the tax credit offered to them by the govern-
ment. Because market prices of ethanol cannot decline due to the mandate, blenders will 
compete for the government subsidy by reducing the implicit price paid by consumers 
for gasoline in their fuel price. This increases gasoline consumption and, thus, increases 
the market price of gasoline and oil. The price of gasoline paid by consumers declines 
until the per-unit subsidy on ethanol is exactly exhausted on an adjusted per-unit basis 
of gasoline consumption—hence the reversal of the intended policy effects.
The expected social costs of having a tax credit when a mandate could have done the 
same thing for the year 0 ranges from $8.7 billion in the short run to $48.5 billion 
3The federal tax credit is $0.5 per gallon and national average state tax credit is about $0.0 per gallon 
 (Koplow 007; Steenblik 007). Babcock (008) predicts that corn-based ethanol production will exceed 
the 5 billion gallon mandate by  billion gallons in 0. This means a projected tax cost of biofuels for 
0 of $.5 billion.
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in the long run (de Gorter and Just 008c). Due to the unique way in which mandates 
reverse the market effects of a tax credit, the intentions of policymakers cannot necessar-
ily be faulted. There is no other example in the economics literature of the interaction 
between a price-based and quantity-based policy measure that generates such a unique 
result as that of a biofuel tax credit and mandate (de Gorter and Just 007b, 008c). 
furthermore, this policy mistake is not unique to the United States, but is a worldwide 
error of judgment as most countries use both mandates and tax credits simultaneously. 
The policy implication is clear: allow the mandate to work by itself, eliminate the tax 
credit and save billions in taxpayer monies. This involves only a modest change in biofuel 
policy while dramatically improving policy achievements.
Import tariffs on ethanol
Many controversies surround US biofuels policy, not least of which is the import tariff 
on ethanol of $0.54 per gallon. Congress implemented this import tariff to offset the tax 
credit. The key reasons why the United States and the world have increased their focus 
on biofuels include global climate change, increasing oil prices with dwindling reserves, 
political instability in oil-exporting countries and the desire for energy security. Because 
the import tariff affects exports from Brazil where ethanol from sugar cane contributes 
far more to reducing greenhouse gases than ethanol derived from corn in the United 
States, many commentators have remarked on how an ethanol tariff contradicts these 
goals (Doornbosch and Steenblik, 007; Howse et al., 00; Jank et al., 007; Kojima 
et al., 007). Clearly, other political goals, such as enhancing farm incomes, reducing 
the tax costs of farm subsidy programs and promoting rural development are also very 
important (rajagopal and Zilberman, 007; tyner, 007).
total US imports of ethanol in calendar year 00 were 53.3 million gallons, almost 
all from Brazil of which approximately a third was routed through the Caribbean to 
avoid the import tariff. Through the Caribbean Basin Initiative, an import quota of 7% 
of domestic US ethanol consumption is tariff free. Brazil exports ethanol with 5% water 
content to the Caribbean, which is reprocessed so that the water content is % and then 
exported to the United States as a different product, thereby overcoming any problems 
with rules of origin in preferential trading agreements (Yacobucci, 005). Imports from 
the Caribbean were only 5% of the maximum allowed so, apparently, the costs of ob-
taining tariff-free status through the Caribbean are significant. 
Concluding remarks
It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the many policies directly impacting the 
ethanol market and the efficacy of the associated multiple policy objectives. neverthe-
less, this paper provides important insights into the social costs and benefits of key policy 
instruments. one key insight is how a change in the price of ethanol affects the corn 
price. Because one bushel of corn produces .8 gallons of ethanol and 3% of the value of 
corn is returned to the market in the form of feed byproducts, every one cent per gallon 
increase in the price of ethanol translates into a 4.0 cent per bushel increase in the price 
of corn. This means a tax credit of $0.57 per gallon (including state credits of $0.0 per 
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gallon) that generates a price premium for ethanol of $0.57 per gallon translates into 
$.3 per bushel for corn. The same outcome occurs if a consumption mandate is used 
instead to generate the same price premium. Because the corn market is now directly 
linked to the ethanol price, which is directly linked to gasoline prices, any change in oil 
prices that affects gasoline prices is now directly transmitted to the price of corn for a 
given level of the tax credit. on the other hand, once a consumption mandate is in place, 
any changes in oil prices will not directly affect the corn price (only indirectly affecting 
costs of production). Hence, a mandate will not transmit instability from the oil market 
to the corn market unlike a tax credit. 
an immediate question is why the tax credit or mandates have not impacted corn 
prices that much until only recently. In fact, the corn price in the past has often been 
lower than this implied subsidy to corn farmers! The reason for why the price of corn 
was rarely affected by the tax credit in the past is either gasoline prices were too low, corn 
prices too high or costs of ethanol production too high for the tax credit to have any 
impact. Low oil prices or high corn prices and processing costs mean that the intercept 
of the ethanol supply curve was far above the price of oil. This “water” in the tax credit 
means the taxpayer costs were mostly wasted in rectangular deadweight costs—no trans-
fers were made to any group in society. In fact, we show that the sole reason for ethanol 
and biodiesel production was for the most part due to production subsidies for either 
corn or ethanol. The tax credits by themselves would have generated little if any ethanol 
production. The historical data show how uncompetitive the US ethanol industry has 
been even with tax credits and mandates.
Because the per-unit tax credits are fixed, a spike in oil prices led to a spike in corn 
prices (with a lag because it took some time to get ethanol processing facilities online). 
Clearly then, fixed per-unit tax credits in the face of oil price spikes causes instability in 
the corn market. Because the corn market is linked to other markets through substitu-
tion in both demand and for land in supply, this price spike in corn markets is quickly 
transmitted to other crop prices. This is partially responsible for the current food crisis 
(runge and Senauer 007).
Careful inspection of the data, however, shows that the price premium for ethanol 
exceeded the tax credits. This means ethanol was purchased historically for other reasons. 
Because mandates at the local, state and federal levels do not appear to bind historically, we 
interpret the data to indicate that either de facto mandates in the form of environmental 
regulations (the Clean air act of the 990s or the implicit ban in MtBe in this decade) 
were responsible for this excessive price premium or that ethanol was purchased for its 
additive value as an oxygenate/octane enhancer. This means refiners and blenders pur-
chase ethanol in fixed proportions to gasoline. This necessarily implies a mandate model 
is appropriate to characterize such a situation and appears to be the case for US ethanol 
until at least 007/08. More recently, the tax credit is binding, but the expanded federal 
rfS in recent energy legislation (in conjunction with continuing local and state mandates) 
may result in an ethanol price premium above the tax credit again in the future.
we also determine that mandates are more efficient than tax credits for the same level of 
ethanol production because mandates result in relatively higher gasoline prices and lower 
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Co emissions and miles traveled. new US energy legislation mandates the use of renew-
able fuel but calls for continuing current biofuel subsidies that will cost taxpayers billions 
of dollars. The subsidies—tax credits—by themselves encourage ethanol production as a 
replacement for oil-based gasoline consumption. But when used with mandates, the tax 
credits will instead unintentionally subsidize gasoline consumption. This contradicts the 
new energy bill’s stated objectives of reducing dependency on oil, improving the envi-
ronment and enhancing rural prosperity. This also has major implications for countries 
worldwide that also use both tax credits and mandates.
although tax costs of farm subsidy programs decline, farm subsidies increase both the tax 
cost and inefficiency costs of the ethanol policies while the latter increase the inefficiency 
costs of the farm-subsidy programs. ethanol policies can, therefore, not be justified on 
the grounds of mitigating the effects of farm-subsidy programs. we also conclude that 
the US ethanol industry requires oil prices of at least $70 per barrel to be able to produce 
any ethanol without government support.
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